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1RESEARCH ARTICLE1
Palm Oil Intensification and Expansion in Indonesia and Malaysia:2
Environmental and Socio-Political Factors Influencing Policy3
1. Introduction4
Intensification and expansion are two essential tenets of commercial agriculture.5
Intensification is defined as an increase in the productivity of land measured by the real value6
of agricultural output per hectare, or in other words, yield increase. Expansion can be simply7
defined as the increase in the area of land used for crops, often involving the conversion of8
forests or other land use types (Byerlee et al., 2014). At the plantation and grower level,9
intensification and expansion are often two-pronged, complementary strategies. This paper10
analyses trends of intensification and expansion in the interlinked oil palm sector in Indonesia11
and Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia today produce approximately 85% of global crude12
palm oil (CPO). Despite similar starting points and also comparable rates of increasing13
productivity and profit in this sector, both countries have developed almost opposite14
trajectories of land use. While both intensification and expansion has occurred in these15
countries, national indicators show that Malaysia has largely pursued intensification while16
Indonesia has overwhelmingly favoured expansion. Part of the explanation for this17
divergence is the nature of the “oil palm complex” identified by Cramb and McCarthy18
(2016), where capital mobility, i.e. the relative ease of access to Indonesian land and labour19
enjoyed by Malaysian companies, accounts for recent patterns of expansion.20
Using the framework of the Jevons paradox, this paper contributes to the existing literature21
by arguing how and why political and social factors, rather than technology and market22
incentives, can better account for the differences between yield and land use efficiency in23
Indonesia and Malaysia today. The research mapping method was adopted to assess the24
recent research literature, classify the types of intensification and expansionist measures in25
both states, and then map them against the economic assumptions that underpin the Jevons26
paradox. The paper firstly argues that expansion in Malaysia has been curtailed by the27
Malaysian government’s pledge to maintain at least 50% forest cover in the late 1990s,28
coupled with a government supported corporate strategy of establishing plantations in29
Indonesia. Indonesia has made no such pledge, leading to expansionist policies focused on30
market creation and production goals with limited incentives for technology-driven31
intensification. It then goes on to note that in recent years, new socio-political developments32
in both countries may yet change this clear dichotomy of opposing land use strategies33
between these two countries, namely Sarawak’s recent autonomous tendencies over land use34
and Indonesia’s new leadership and international No Deforestation Peat and Exploitation35
(NDPE) commitments. It concludes that the key economic principles of the Jevons paradox36
largely still hold; and human manifestations of the paradox, driven by complex social and37
political factors, makes production more efficient and enables consumers to buy more palm38
oil. As transboundary haze and deforestation linked to this sector continues to be major39
concerns in the region, efforts must continue in both countries to decrease incentives for40
expansion and vice versa.41
1.1. Conceptual Framework42
2In the late nineteenth century, the economist William Stanley Jevons analysed the use of coal,43
and he found that each increment of additional efficiency in coal extraction and utilization,44
enabled by technological advances, was met with an increment of additional coal extracted45
and consumed (Czech, 2006). The point of the paradox is that, as long as economic growth is46
the goal, technological progress will result in increased consumption rather than biodiversity47
conservation. The paradox seems to be reproduced in coal, mining, forestry, energy, and48
other sectors, and Nelson and Vucetich (2012) have studied the human tendency to manifest49
the Jevons paradox. Technology increases the efficiency of resource exploitation, but it does50
not determine how people should exercise that ability and efficiency. An example from the51
US in the 1970s shows that technology and economic incentives led to more efficient home52
heating and insulation, but rather than using less energy, people built larger houses because53
heating became more affordable (Nelson and Vucetich, 2012).54
Byerlee et al. (2014; 2013) find that while intuitively we tend to think that intensification55
would be the best way to conserve natural ecosystems from agricultural encroachment, under56
certain circumstances intensification can drive expansion as well. They see intensification as57
either a technology-driven or market-driven process. Technology-driven intensification58
occurs when technical change in a crop allows more output on land per unit of input, and has59
been proven to be generally land saving. Market-driven intensification in turn results from a60
shift in product mix to higher value crops due to new market opportunities, like the high61
prices of certain commodities. Market-driven intensification raises economic productivity and62
profit on the land, and therefore provides incentives to expand the area of land available for63
cultivation or exploitation, giving rise to a form of the Jevons paradox (Alcott, 2005).64
Factors Definition/Details Short-Term Long-Term
Technology-driven Technical change and
advancement in a crop
More output on land per unit of
input
land
saving/intensifi
cation (Alcott,
2005)
Market-driven Shift in product mix to
higher value crops due to
new market opportunities,
like the high prices of
certain commodities
Raises economic productivity
and profit on land, providing
incentives to expand the area of
land available for cultivation or
exploitation
land expansion
- Jevons
paradox (Alcott,
2005)
Human-driven
political and social
incentives
(Malaysia)
Forest cover pledge,
intensification policies to
work within pledge
limitations
capital mobility to Indonesia
(driving expansion there)
land
saving/intensifi
cation in
Malaysia
Human-driven
political and social
disincentives
(Indonesia)
No forest commitments,
expansionist policies
focused on market creation
and production goals
limited incentives for
technology-driven
intensification
land expansion
in Indonesia
65
Table 1: Factors causing Intensification and Expansion66
It has been argued that the increase of oil palm prices in the 1980s encouraged a shift from67
other crops to oil palm in Southeast Asia, and the resulting profits have been a major driver of68
3deforestation (Byerlee et al., 2014). This does not explain why the rate of deforestation69
related to oil palm after the 1980s increased more rapidly in Indonesia than in Malaysia. A70
previous study by Miyamoto et al. (2014) presented evidence that deforestation in Malaysia71
for oil palm expansion had slowed down in the mid-1980s, but notes that further research is72
necessary in order to understand the underlying causes for this. Thus, using the framework of73
the Jevons paradox, this paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the human74
tendency to manifest the Jevons paradox, arguing how and why political and social factors,75
rather than technology and market incentives, can better account for the differences between76
yield and land use efficiency in Indonesia and Malaysia today. The paper argues that77
expansion in Malaysia has been curtailed by the Malaysian government’s pledge to maintain78
at least 50% forest cover in the late 1990s, coupled with capital mobility enabling Malaysian79
companies to exploit opportunities in neighbouring Indonesia, with the same overall result for80
land use and conservation. Indonesia has made no such pledge, leading to expansionist81
policies focused on market creation and production goals with limited incentives for82
technology-driven intensification.83
1.2. Methods84
This paper uses a research mapping method, as the most appropriate method to assess the85
existing intellectual terrain, as well as to specify research questions that contribute to the86
existing body of knowledge on forestry and plantations in tropical Southeast Asia (Tranfield87
et al., 2003). Since this study is interpretive and qualitative, research mapping is found to be88
more appropriate than systematic review methods, as this study does not involve numerical89
aggregation or meta-analysis (Tranfield et al., 2003).1 We assess a sample of recently90
published studies on the political economy of palm oil and land use policy based on general91
database searches using keywords such as “palm oil”, “intensification” and “expansion”. We92
found that some key studies related to Indonesia and Malaysia were not retrieved in this way,93
and so we manually browsed recent issues of influential journals such as The Journal of94
Peasant Studies, Land Use Policy and Forest Policy and Economics. National media,95
government and corporate sources from Indonesia and Malaysia were used to fill some of the96
informational and data gaps that we identified in the literature. Similar to the approach used97
by Jorgensen and Gobster (2010), we assess the recent research literature and classify the98
types of intensification and expansionist measures that are found in Indonesia and Malaysia,99
mapping them against the economic assumptions that underpin the Jevons paradox.2 This100
method revealed significant political and social factors that impact on decision-making101
processes and land use policies in the two comparative case studies we focus on, as illustrated102
in Table 1.103
2. Land Use Efficiency and Palm Oil Production104
While Indonesia is the larger producer in terms of volume, in terms of efficiency, Malaysia105
has consistently outperformed its neighbouring competitor. Production efficiency in the oil106
1 Systematic reviews are typically applied in fields and disciplines favouring positivist and
quantitative approaches.
2 Jorgensen and Gobster (2010, 341) developed a three-step strategy to identify their study sample.
We did not replicate precisely this semi-systematic approach, but we used aspects of their method to
build our own sample of literature pertaining to comparative processes of palm oil intensification and
expansion.
4palm industry is measured by yield per hectare and extraction rate and generally, Malaysia107
has been more efficient (see Table 1). Relative inefficiency leads to concerns about108
unnecessary land pressure in Indonesia for the production of CPO. The situation is109
particularly concerning given that most of the land use change in Indonesia has been in110
natural primary rainforest and peatlands (Wicke et al., 2011). Adding to this complexity is the111
fact that about 18% (Aidenvironment, 2014) to 30% (Brockhaus et al., 2012) of Indonesia’s112
oil palm area is being controlled by Malaysian capital owners.113
Parameters Malaysia Indonesia
Planted area 5.2 mil hectares (See Chart 1) 12.3 mil hectares (See Chart 2)
National Annual Yield 21 tonnes per hectare of fresh
fruit bunches (FFB)
17 tonnes per hectare of FFB
Oil Extraction Rate 20%
Mature/Immature 86%/14% 75%/25%
Share of World Market 41% 46%
Types of Production 61.2% on private estates,
22.5% on organised
smallholder land (including
FELDA3, FELCRA4,
RISDA5 and state agencies),
16.3% on independent
smallholder land
53% of on private estates, 6%
on state-owned company land,
8.6% on plasma smallholder
land, 32.4% on independent
smallholder land
114
Table 2: Efficiency Comparisons between Malaysia and Indonesia – most recent115
available figures (Arulandoo, 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2015; indexMundi, 2018; Ministry116
of Agriculture, 2017; MPOB, 2017; Rachmat, 2017; Saieed and Adnan, 2017;117
Stevenson, 2014)118
This pattern of land use change gives rise to concerns of forest encroachment, loss of carbon119
sequestration and biodiversity loss (Byerlee et al., 2014). Deforestation has also contributed120
to a sharp rise in the annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Indonesia. For example, in121
2013, Indonesia ranked as the fourth highest greenhouse gas emitter (including land-use122
change and forestry) in the world after China, the United States and India (World Resources123
Institute, 2017). In Malaysia, by contrast, oil palm expansion has largely occurred in logged-124
over secondary forests and on former plantations (Wicke et al., 2011), although this does not125
prevent opposition to expansion and deforestation in Malaysia (Mukherjee and Sovacool,126
2014).127
2.1. Malaysia’s Pledge, Intensification and Regionalization128
In the 1930s, Malaysia was the world’s largest rubber producer, producing about 50% of the129
world’s rubber. At its peak, Malaysia had as much as 1.4 million hectares of planted rubber130
(Hays, 2013). However, the invention of synthetic rubber gradually reduced the demand for131
natural rubber, resulting in lower rubber prices on the international commodities markets.132
Market forces drove intensification in the form of a shift in product mix: from rubber that133
3 Federal Land Development Authority
4 Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority.
5 Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority.
5produced the low-price latex product, to oil palm that produced the in-demand palm oil.134
Between 1999 and 2004, about 300,000 hectares of former rubber plantations were converted135
into oil palm plantations (Hays, 2013). This market-driven intensification increased the136
economic returns from the land, resulting in the Jevons paradox. Even more rubber137
plantations were converted to oil palm, and lands that were planted with other less lucrative138
crops like coconut and cocoa followed suit (Wicke et al., 2011).139
While this paradox has triggered substantial agricultural expansion in the late 1900s and early140
2000s, this has largely been in former plantations, and also logged-over secondary forests141
(Wicke et al., 2011). This has meant that market-driven intensification in Malaysia did not142
result in as much deforestation of natural pristine rainforests. This is because, first, Malaysia143
was already at quite an advanced stage of natural resource exploitation before the shift to144
palm oil, so this was not a significant direct cause of land use change from pristine forest to145
cropland. Related to this were significant amounts of deagrarianization of land around146
Malaysia that were previously cultivated by smallholders, increasing the availability of land147
that could be converted into large-scale commercial palm oil cropland. Cramb (2009)148
explains that this was related to the rural-urban migration in the mid-1980s where many rural149
communities lost their population, and hence farm labour, to non-agrarian pursuits such as150
education.151
A second and related point is the Malaysian government’s voluntary pledge to keep 50% of152
its forest cover intact (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997). Logging was a major export industry for153
Malaysia following its independence in 1957, as Malaysia’s lush rainforest contained much154
high-quality, in-demand hardwoods (Jomo, 2003). As a result of these logging practises,155
Malaysia faced serious criticism from environmentalists in the 1980s (Nossal and Stubbs,156
1997). Several European governments announced boycotts of Malaysian timber due to157
unsustainable rates of deforestation (Mohamed, 1999). Mahathir Mohamed, Malaysia’s Prime158
Minister at the time, fervently defended Malaysia’s position, arguing that “we are not159
exploiting the forests for no good reason. We need money. We have to export wood because160
we need the foreign exchange without which we cannot buy what we want” (Sustainable161
Development News, 1992). As a sort of peace offering to the international community, and in162
an attempt to prove that Malaysia could indeed develop sustainably, Malaysia pledged at the163
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 that it would keep164
50% of its land area forested (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997).165
This international pressure, and the need for Malaysia to silence its critics, proved166
overwhelming enough to drown out the immediate expansionist tendencies of the local palm167
oil sector. During this time, prominent individuals from within the sector such as Dr Yusof168
Basiron, CEO of the Malaysian Palm Oil Council, lobbied hard for the Malaysian169
government to push for palm oil plantations to be classified as ‘plantation forest’, so that any170
forest conversion into palm oil plantations would not be considered deforestation.6 While this171
expansionist lobby continues today (Basiron, 2014), at the governmental level the argument172
for reclassification has not gained traction. Instead, the government of Malaysia has173
encouraged and supported corporate strategy to expand into Indonesia to avoid profit losses174
resulting from land restrictions in Malaysia.175
6 The Malaysian government has in the past successfully lobbied for rubber plantations to be
classified as “forest” by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
6176
Chart 1: Oil palm land area in Malaysia (indexMundi, 2018)177
Malaysia’s pledge came at a time when land conversion was still occurring at a significant178
rate, and this pledge continues to influence Malaysia’s approach to agricultural expansion.179
Rapid deforestation was witnessed in Malaysia until the 1980s, but since the land pledge it180
has slowed down substantially. Some years even registered a manageable deforestation rate181
of 1% per annum, while in other years deforestation was as low as 0.1% (Wicke et al., 2011).182
A recent speech by Malaysia’s Minister for Environment and Natural Resources, Dr Wan183
Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar, at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change184
(UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) 22 in Marrakech, announced that Malaysia185
currently has 54.5% forest cover (Tuanku Jaafar, 2016).7 This means that Malaysia has less186
than 5% of forest left into which expansion can occur.8 The area covered by oil palm187
plantations doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s, although the forest cover pledge has meant188
that Malaysia’s expansion over the past decade has been relatively slow. For example, for a189
ten-year period from 2003 to 2013, Malaysia’s land expansion for palm oil has been at an190
average of only 130,000 hectares per year (Ling, 2014). The limited available land area is191
projected to limit future expansion to only about 100,000 hectares per year (Ling, 2014), with192
an upper limit of 5.6 million hectares (EU Delegation to Malaysia, 2012; Ling, 2014).193
7 This figure excludes palm oil plantations but includes all rubber plantation land in both West and
East Malaysia, including those managed by smallholders.
8 Forest area is defined as land “spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than five meters
and a canopy cover of more than 10 percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ” (FAO). A
remaining concern is the fact that the 54.5% of forest cover declared by Malaysia includes areas
planted with forest tree species such as pines, acacia mangium, gmelina arborea, and rubber. These
are known as forest plantations and fall under the classification of forest since their end products feed
the timber industry. Hence, while forest cover remains, the quality of these forests may be reduced as
these forest plantations are (selectively) logged. While this is an important point that questions the
‘quality’ of Malaysia’s forest cover pledge, it is less so in the context of this paper on the palm oil
industry. The conversion of forests to palm oil does not merely involve a deterioration of forest
quality, but a total conversion of forest cover areas to non-forest cover areas. Hence, any palm oil
expansion would involve a reduction in total forest cover percentage, and not merely reduction of
(less-countable) forest quality.
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7While the 50% forest cover pledge is non-binding and thus can be considered largely194
symbolic, the Malaysian government has consistently reiterated its commitment to the 50%195
pledge at the domestic and international level, including the 2009 Copenhagen Climate196
Conference and the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Embas,197
2012). The industry keeps a close eye on deforestation limit figures in all major industry198
gatherings, like the annual Palm Oil Trade Fair and Seminar (Basiron, 2012a). Despite these199
apparent restrictions, palm oil continues to be a major productive crop and export commodity200
for Malaysia. It is the fourth largest contributor to the national economy and employs as201
many as 3 million people in various capacities (Ferdous Alam et al., 2015). As such, the202
government has put into place several policies to ensure that the oil palm sector can continue203
to prosper despite the 50% forest cover pledge, mainly by focusing on intensification locally,204
and expansion in neighbouring Indonesia. These policies are discussed in detail below.205
Firstly, while most plantation companies carry out their own research and development, the206
Malaysian government has historically influenced the direction of agricultural research and207
development (R&D). The government set up the Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia208
(PORIM) in 1974, which was then merged with the Palm Oil Licensing Authority (PORLA)209
in 1998 to create the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). As a R&D agency with major210
companies on its advisory board, MPOB’s focus has overwhelmingly been technical-based211
intensification, with the goal of closing the yield gap between the current average yield (21212
tonnes FFB per hectare in Malaysia) and the potential yield (35 tonnes) (Fairhurst et al.,213
2010). MPOB has been particularly successful in developing high-yielding seed varieties and214
tissue cultures, and also ascertaining ideal levels of nutrients and fertilisers for plants to215
improve productivity (Wahid et al., 2004).216
Importantly, the MPOB shares its technical findings with smallholders, who make up about217
38.8% of all oil palm growers in Malaysia (MPOB, 2017). There are some 205,000218
independent oil palm smallholders in Malaysia, from a total of about 680,000 smallholders219
(Kailany, 2011), with a total planted area as per 2014 of 807,000 hectares (about 15% of220
planted oil palm area) (Chandramohan et al., 2015). Yields produced by independent221
smallholders are significantly lower than those in commercial plantations, and so the MPOB222
tries to ensure that high-yielding seed varieties are made available at an affordable price to223
smallholders. In addition, the MPOB has Oil Palm Teaching and Advisory (Tunjuk Ajar dan224
Nasihat Sawit, TUNAS) officers at all major growing cities that offer regulatory, training and225
advisory services to smallholders (Basiron, 2012b). As an incentive for intensification, all226
growers who achieve yields of 30 tonnes FFB per hectare are eligible to join MPOB’s 30227
Tonnes Club, enjoying benefits like subsidised workshops and first priority technical advice228
from MPOB officers (Leong, 2014).229
Secondly, the Malaysian government has established several organised land collectives, with230
complementary political and economic objectives. The oldest and best-known of these is the231
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). FELDA was established in 1956, and was232
promoted as a “catch up” vehicle for the poorer Malay and bumiputera9 communities (Cooke,233
2006), with the ultimate goal of eradicating rural poverty (Sloane-White and Beaulieu, 2010).234
FELDA started out by channelling federal funds to state governments to develop land.235
9 Literally translatable to “sons of the soil”, which excludes the Chinese and Indian communities
which were considered pendatang, or immigrants.
8However, the states had other priorities and lacked the expertise for managing land settlement236
schemes. In 1960, FELDA was reimagined as a federal-level developer of land resettlement237
programmes (O'Donnell et al., 2017). To this end, the Malaysian government granted vast238
areas of agricultural land to FELDA all over Malaysia. Through a stringent but also239
politicised selection process10 (Benjamin and Gasper, 2001; Pletcher, 1991), bumiputera240
smallholder families were selected and settled in these FELDA designated areas. Each family241
was given title deeds to about 4 hectares of land, where they cultivated under an “organised242
smallholder” system.243
From the 1990s, FELDA reinvented itself as a developer of commercial plantations and244
settler development projects, essentially overseeing Malaysia’s largest group of organised oil245
palm smallholders. FELDA smallholders now make up about 710,000 hectares of palm oil246
land, or about 12.3% of all palm oil cultivated land in the country (MPOB, 2017). These247
smallholder farmers benefited from the highly organised FELDA schemes, which are run248
very similarly to a commercial plantation. Each FELDA scheme has a manager, plantation249
officer and agronomist to encourage best management practises. Because of this, a significant250
amount of FELDA smallholders have been able to join MPOB’s “30 Tonnes Club”.251
Furthermore, as an important strategy in retaining the support of the rural Malays (Sloane-252
White and Beaulieu, 2010), the government maintained interest in encouraging and enabling253
high productivity in these settlements, to keep the settlers happy and supportive of BN. In254
terms of land use, since each smallholder is assigned their land size at the beginning of their255
settlement, expansion within FELDA schemes have been at a relatively controlled rate.256
FELDA has since developed a commercial arm called FELDA Global Ventures (FGV),257
which has interests in China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand. It is now the third largest258
palm oil operator in the world. The entity has recently been embroiled in property fraud259
allegations at home and abroad (O'Donnell et al., 2017), however the controversy has260
managed to remain separate from FELDA’s core business of organised smallholder261
collectives. Other similar land collectives have since been established in Malaysia generally262
following the FELDA model, with varied levels of success. These include FELCRA, RISDA263
(originally for rubber but now increasingly for oil palm), and the Sarawak Land264
Consolidation Agency (SALCRA), which is discussed in detail in section 3.1.265
Thirdly, oil palm intensification is a focus of the Malaysian government’s Economic266
Transformation Program (ETP) launched in 2010. The broad objective is to bring the industry267
closer to the national FFB yield target of 26.2 tonnes per hectare by 2020 by focusing on268
technology-driven intensification at the plantation level as well as downstream activities269
(ETP, 2014). The basic idea is to encourage replanting, improve FFB yield, and improve270
worker productivity through mechanization. Replanting is a challenge because of the 3 year271
lag before a new plant begins to produce FFB, and many smallholders are reluctant to replant,272
even though better materials are available. This has resulted in old trees that are harder to273
harvest, bringing smallholder yields down and resulting in stagnating national average yields.274
10 FELDA performs a very important political function. Loyalty to the ruling party coalition, Barisan
Nasional (BN), was among the key criterion used to select the settlers. FELDA settler areas were seen
as vote banks for BN, and victory was very likely in FELDA areas during both state and general
elections. In return, funds are often officially set aside for FELDA settlers as their ‘reward’ during
festive seasons, and BN often reiterates that the support of more than 100,000 FELDA settler families
nationwide was key in maintaining political stability in the country.
9To counter this, the Malaysian government is providing financial grants to smallholders to275
cover the cost of replanting, as well as a monthly allowance of US$157 until the young trees276
are productive (Ferdous Alam et al., 2015). To improve FFB yield, smallholders are277
encouraged to join cooperatives that enable them to enjoy bulk discounts on agricultural278
inputs and better pricing for their produce (ETP, 2014). Such technology-driven279
intensification is especially appreciated among smallholders with limited resources. If280
smallholders are able to achieve more output per unit it is logical that they will prefer to281
concentrate on intensification rather than more expensive forms of expansion.282
Finally, despite these mainly self-imposed limits to growth at home, the Malaysian283
government did not see this as a barrier to continue being a major player in the international284
palm oil sector. The neighbouring land expanses of Indonesia, together with other smaller285
areas in Papua and Brazil (Koh and Wilcove, 2008) were identified as the potential avenues286
for market expansion. Indonesia, with its large market, plentiful labour and land, and287
comparatively lower operation costs (Haji Mat Zin, 1999), was especially ideal. Hence, from288
the 1990s onwards, the Malaysian government was instrumental in facilitating the mobility of289
capital from well-established Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) and well-connected290
private conglomerates into Indonesia. Beyond this, the Malaysian government was also active291
in establishing and funding industry promotional groups and lobby groups11 to further support292
the ongoing operations of these firms once established in Indonesia (Varkkey, 2016).293
Malaysia is currently the biggest foreign investor in the Indonesian palm oil plantation sector294
(Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2011). It is estimated that there are 162 plantations in Indonesia that295
have linkages to Malaysian companies (Adnan, 2013; Maruli, 2011; WALHI et al., 2009).296
Hence, somewhat ironically, while limited land availability has helped control the pace of297
expansion in Malaysia, market-driven intensification has encouraged expansion by Malaysian298
plantation companies, not so much at home, but abroad (Rajenthran, 2002). As such, the299
Jevons paradox of intensification fuelling expansion has taken on a transnational dimension.300
With the support of the Malaysian government, major Malaysian commercial plantations are301
continuing to look and expand to greenfields abroad, especially in Indonesia (Basiron,302
2012b). However, this has not meant that expansion in Malaysia can stop completely. While303
capital mobility from Malaysia to Indonesia in this sector is currently active, the political304
relationship between the two countries can be volatile and may affect these investments305
(Varkkey, 2016). 12 As such, even while Malaysian capital is driving expansion in Indonesia,306
Malaysian plantation companies must still focus on intensification and some strategic307
expansion in Malaysia for the long term.308
The oil palm industry is among the most regulated industries in Malaysia. As a result, land309
transactions, especially among the large commercial growers, have been generally above310
board. New plantings have been formally limited to logged-over lands or old agricultural311
lands (MPOC, 2006). While there have been cases of plantations encroaching into forest312
lands and NCR lands (especially in Sarawak, discussed in section 3.1), this has been the313
exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, the limits to growth due to the 50% forest314
11 Most notable being the Association of Oil palm Plantation Investors of Malaysia in Indonesia
(APIMI), which enjoys direct access to both Malaysian and Indonesian political leadership.
12 For example, in 1997, Indonesia abruptly closed off its palm oil sector to foreign investors
following demands by Indonesian nationalists. And more recently in 2014, there was a call in the
Indonesian parliament to limit foreign (particularly Malaysian) ownership of plantations in Indonesia
10
pledge have been at the forefront of commercial growers’ strategies in Malaysia. At the same315
time, the booming palm oil market serves as a great incentive for expansion among316
commercial plantations.317
318
2.2. Land Use Governance and Expansion in Indonesia319
Palm oil was revived as a major agricultural industry with the help of the Indonesian state in320
late 1960s, for instance with the establishment of state-owned plantation estates (Perseroan321
Terbatas Perkebunan, PTP) (Larson, 1996). The policy successfully expanded the area322
devoted to oil palm cultivation on government estates, which grew from 84,000 hectares in323
1969 to 176,000 hectares in 1979 to 343,000 hectares in 1987. As the international demand324
for palm oil drove commodity prices higher, Indonesian growers were encouraged to change325
their product mix. For example, planting oil palm in Indonesia can yield estimated net present326
values of between $3,835 and $9,630 per hectare per year (Lee, 2011), compared to the327
average of between $1,283 and $1,416 per hectare per year for other crops (Prasetyo et al.,328
2009). Hence, more growers chose to grow palm oil, and those that did so saw the profits329
that they could reap from their land increase dramatically.330
The Jevons paradox states that such increase in productivity can serve as an incentive to331
expand land area, and indeed this is what happened in Indonesia. Being about six times larger332
than Malaysia in terms of land area, the Indonesian oil palm industry was able to grow333
swiftly (Basiron, 2007; Nature, 2007). Furthermore, unlike Malaysia, Indonesia has never334
made any clearly defined forest cover pledges to the international community. Hence, the335
profits emanating for the sector provided a strong incentive for expansion.336
Since the 1980s, the state pursued deregulation policies and paved the way for the market to337
shape the industry (Susanti and Maryudi, 2016). This had led to rapid expansion during this338
time, especially in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Total plantation area rose significantly from339
117,000 hectares in 1969 to 3.9 million hectares in 1999 (Palm Oil Agribusiness Strategic340
Policy Institute, 2014). This was further encouraged by a specific policy goal set by the341
Indonesian government during this time to surpass Malaysia as the world’s largest CPO342
producer (Van Gelder, 2004). With the introduction of private sector driven partnership343
models since 1999,13 expansions happened rapidly in existing estates (Casson, 2002;344
Daemeter, 2015; McCarthy, 2010). However, as these pre-existing croplands quickly345
dwindled, expansion began to occur in natural primary rainforests and peatlands, a trend346
which has continued to present times (Wicke et al., 2011).347
After local Indonesian investors established themselves in the sector, the Indonesian348
government opened up the sector to foreign investors in the early 1990s, along with attractive349
incentives (Rifin, 2010). This followed Indonesia’s commitment to the structural reforms350
outlined by International Monetary Fund (IMF), which required the government to ease351
restrictions for foreign investment in the palm oil sector. This marked the entry point of352
Malaysian plantation companies into Indonesia. The area harvested with oil palm in353
Indonesia increased dramatically from around 70,000 hectares in the 1960s to 1.6 million354
13 In 1999, the Pola Kemitraan scheme was enacted, introducing models in which the private sector
became the main industry driver while reducing the autonomy of smallholders related to plantation
management.
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hectares by 1997. Expansion slowed down during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, as355
many plantation companies faced financial difficulties (Casson, 2002). Another wave of356
foreign investment then occurred as the government invited investors to take over failing357
Indonesian plantation companies. In 1998 the total land area increased to about 2.01 million358
hectares (FAOSTAT, 2012; Wicke et al., 2011) and in 2006, Indonesian plantations achieved359
their tipping point and Indonesia overtook Malaysia as the largest producer of palm oil (Jarvis360
et al., 2010; McCarthy, 2010).361
It is important to note, however, that Indonesia is able to surpass Malaysia thanks to362
Malaysian companies operating in it. In 1997, Indonesian nationalists successfully pushed for363
a moratorium for foreign investment, arguing provocatively that Malaysian companies364
already controlled 3 million hectares (Aidenvironment, 2014). The Asian Financial Crisis365
broke the moratorium and Malaysian companies again started to expand their operations in366
Indonesia. In 2013, it was reported that Malaysian company groups’ aggregate oil palm land367
banks in the country reached 1.8 million hectares, contributing around 18% of oil palm land368
area in 2013 (Aidenvironment, 2014; Ministry of Agriculture, 2017). Other sources369
mentioned that 30% of palm oil land in Indonesia is controlled by Malaysian entities370
(Brockhaus et al., 2012). As in the 1990s, such statistics led to dissatisfaction amongst some371
Indonesians, who argue that the Indonesian palm oil industry is increasingly “being372
controlled by foreigners” (Handr, 2009). In Kalimantan, according to a GAPKI (Indonesian373
Palm Oil Association) official, 60% of the palm oil area is controlled by foreign capital374
owners, mainly Malaysian companies (Wibowo, 2013).375
376
This nationalist sentiment adds complexity to the already complex policy environment of377
palm oil industry expansion in Indonesia. With the introduction of a more private sector-378
driven partnership scheme in 1999, Malaysian capital is among the most important sources of379
the growth of the palm oil industry in Indonesia. Hence, expansion in Indonesia is driven by a380
combination of local and foreign factors: local companies and smallholders, feeling381
threatened by the increasing presence of foreign entities, particularly Malaysian companies,382
are pressuring the government to provide them with more facilities, such as access for383
funding, land, and technical support.384
385
It is estimated that oil palm land area in Indonesia currently stands at 12.3 million hectares386
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2017). It contributes around 7% to Indonesia’s GDP annually (Bank387
Indonesia, 2014; Das, 2014), and employs about 20 million people, both directly and388
indirectly (Simamora, 2011). For example, in Riau, one of the major palm oil producing389
regions in Indonesia, 85% of all palm oil plantations were created on natural forest land. In390
between 1982 and 2007, large scale oil palm plantations were responsible for 29% of total391
forest cover loss, with an additional 7% contributed by smallholders. Furthermore, forest392
cover loss in Sumatra and Kalimantan (2.5% per year between 1985 and 1997), the major oil393
palm growing areas in Indonesia, is significantly higher than Indonesia’s national level forest394
cover loss of 1.9% per year (Wicke et al., 2011).395
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Chart 2: Oil palm land area in Indonesia (Ministry of Agriculture, 2017)397
For Indonesia, in accordance with the economic assumptions that underpin the Jevons398
paradox, intensification is closely tied to expansion. Earlier research has revealed that land399
productivity, in terms of palm oil yields, is an accurate predictor of where new estates will400
appear in Indonesia. If plantations on a particular area have been displaying high rates of401
productivity, adjacent lands are likely to be opened up for expansion as well (Lian and402
Ghazoul, 2010). Furthermore, smallholders who are able to achieve high yields through403
intensification are likely to expand their operations, using the additional profits obtained (Zen404
et al., 2005). Clearly, profitability drives expansion in Indonesia, where expansion seems to405
be politically and socially acceptable as economic growth and food production are higher406
priorities than conservation (Sayer et al., 2012).407
Indonesia’s average national yield has consistently been below Malaysia’s. According to408
Donough et al. (2011), there are generally three main areas where yield gaps can be409
commonly observed among plantations in Indonesia, both large-scale and small. The first gap410
is due to management deficiencies during the development of a plantation until trees reach411
maturity. The second gap concerns poor nutrient management in the production phase. The412
third yield gap is caused by inefficiencies in the general management of the mature trees413
(excluding nutrients). It must be noted, though, that smallholders and local business investors414
are highly heterogeneous in Indonesia. Different typologies of smallholders, such as415
independent smallholders with individual partnerships, farmer cooperatives, or company-416
managed plasma model smallholders have different levels of productivity (CPI and PILAR,417
2015). While the causes of the yield gap are well understood, the realities on the ground in418
Indonesia do not create incentives towards technology-driven intensification to overcome419
these gaps. Intensification requires high investment in R&D activity, and there is a significant420
lag time due to the learning process required for the application of intensification methods421
(Zen et al., 2005). There are more incentives for expansion to make up for the production422
shortfall. While Malaysian growers are indirectly forced to intensify due to limited land, this423
situation does not exist in Indonesia.424
425
MPOB, FELDA and the ETP are among the institutions and incentives in Malaysia that have426
played important roles in encouraging intensification. While there are similar entities in427
Indonesia in all three aspects, these Indonesian efforts have been relatively less successful428
than their Malaysian counterparts. Firstly, Indonesia’s equivalent to MPOB is the Indonesian429
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Oil Palm Research Institute (IOPRI). Formerly a generalised agriculture research institute430
inherited from the Dutch, the body changed its name to IOPRI and its specialisation to oil431
palm in 1992. While R&D into high-yielding palms commenced in the 1920s, the seed432
varieties produced have been unable to meet the productivity levels of Malaysian seeds.433
Furthermore, while MPOB in Malaysia has succeeded in disseminating high-quality seeds434
among their independent smallholders, IOPRI has been less successful in this aspect. For435
example, a promising joint initiative between IOPRI, local plantation agencies (dinas436
perkebunan), and local estate companies in the 2000s set up large nurseries selling improved437
seedlings at subsidised prices and an accompanying support program. However,438
decentralisation has shifted the control of plantation agencies to the district (kabupaten) level.439
Some districts cut off funding to their plantation agencies, which resulted in the uneven440
success of this joint program (Zen et al., 2005). This is particularly problematic when441
considering that independent smallholders are the largest group of smallholders in Indonesia.442
While independent smallholders in Malaysia make up only about 42%14 of all smallholders,443
in Indonesia, about 79%15 are independent (Rachmat, 2017).444
445
FELDA’s smallholder scheme is the model of choice for encouraging productivity among446
smallholders in Malaysia, whereas Indonesia’s equivalent, the nucleus-plasma scheme, first447
introduced through Perkebunan Inti Rakyat program in 1980s, has had limited success in this448
aspect. While the formal partnership model changed to a more private sector-driven449
partnership model since early 2000s, the Indonesian government still requires all large private450
plantations (“nucleus”) to prepare a minimum of 20% of its total concession area for451
surrounding smallholders. In 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture issued the Regulation No.452
98/2013 that allows the obligatory 20% to be built outside the concession area as long as the453
size is equivalent. These smallholders would run their plots (“plasma”) under formal454
partnership with the companies, which includes cooperation for the transportation of FFB,455
procurement of agricultural input, processing, and marketing (Ministry of Agriculture, 2013).456
About 500,000 smallholders are under such schemes in Indonesia, taking up about a third of457
all oil palm planted areas (Mukherjee and Sovacool, 2014). However, because the form of458
cooperation with smallholders differs from one plantation to another, rates of productivity459
among plasma smallholders have varied greatly. Rather than looking at the nucleus-plasma460
cooperation mechanism through the lens of intensification, the government sees it more in461
terms of reducing inequality and preventing social conflicts in plantation areas. With this462
perspective, the obligation for plantation companies to prepare a minimum of 20% of their463
total concession area for surrounding smallholders leads not to intensification but to464
expansion because many companies, such as Golden Agri Resources (Agus, 2017) prefer to465
give the smallholders plots outside the concession area.466
467
Smallholders in Indonesia, including independent, cooperatives or company-managed,468
generaly suffer from limited assistance and varying degrees of disorganization. These factors,469
combined with limited technical knowledge on how to optimize production, has led to low470
rates of productivity (Zen et al., 2005) which also forces smallholders to expand in an471
14 Calculated by the author from this and other reliable sources. MPOB estimates that independent
smallholders manage 933,948 hectares of land, while organised smallholders manage 1,268,365
hectares of land (MPOB, 2017).
15 We use Rachmat’s (2017) definition of an “independent smallholder”, which is a smallholder who
is not part of a plasma scheme. Rachmat’s latest data indicate that smallholders make up about 41% of
the total palm oil area, with 21% of this made up of plasma smallholders and 79% independent
smallholders.
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attempt to earn more. In tropical countries with large populations of rural dwellers living in or472
close to poverty, these populations will opt for more planted area rather than natural forests473
(Sayer et al., 2012). Hence, in Indonesia, both high and low productivity can encourage474
expansion, creating a seemingly zero-sum game for forest conservation.475
In terms of national strategy, Malaysia’s ETP has focused on intensifying current palm oil476
production to increase the efficient use of available land. Indonesia’s national palm oil477
strategy over the years have been about achieving production goals, without an explicit focus478
on how to achieve those goals (either through intensification or expansion). This trend began479
in the 1980s when Indonesia declared its intention to become the world’s largest palm oil480
producer (Van Gelder, 2004) and has continued to current times with goals to double481
production (Lian and Ghazoul, 2010). The Indonesian government has also focused on482
increasing national demand for palm oil with the implementation of an aggressive biofuel483
policy that sets mandatory targets for palm-biodiesel blends across various sectors like484
transportation, electricity and public service (Kharina et al., 2016). When such national485
strategies focus on production goals without setting limits for growth or clearly identifying486
strategies for achieving these goals, the sector understandably will take the path of least487
resistance to achieve these goals. In Indonesia, this path has generally been expansion.488
Technological innovation for expansion is difficult and expensive. So why should a sector489
innovate when there is so much land available? Indeed, in Indonesia, well-connected business490
elites have always been able to obtain land concessions. Land has historically been used for491
patronage transactions in Indonesia. Patronage transactions are prevalent in the Indonesian492
business world, and are described in Scott’s (Scott, 1972) classic study as a situation where a493
patron with a higher socio-economic position (normally from the government elite) exercises494
their influence and resources to provide for a client of lower status (business elite) in495
exchange for political support, assistance or services. With a sizeable monetary or in kind496
exchange, for example support during elections, business elites can secure rights to497
concessions. Such materialistic relationships are especially prevalent between oil palm498
interests and local government elites, as detailed in a recent case study in West Kalimantan499
by Prabowo et al (2017). These well-connected clients will find it easy to bypass the technical500
complexities of formal procedures for the conversion of forest to oil palm (Setiawan et al.,501
2016).502
Mutually symbiotic patron-client relationships lead to situations of state capture at the503
national and regional level as well (Ascher, 1998), where major plantation players have had504
considerable influence in shaping Indonesia’s land policy (Sayer et al., 2012). The Ministry505
of Forestry, the National Land Agency, and regional governments are especially vulnerable to506
state capture, as they are the core bureaucracies responsible in both forest area and title forest507
(Sahide and Giessen, 2015). As a result, for example, Reducing Emissions through508
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) projects in Indonesia were often subject to509
an uncertain and highly contested forest management regime, undermining attempts to510
demonstrate the viability of operationalising market mechanisms at the local scale (Boer,511
2018). The moratoriums that were part of the REDD+ projects were found to have been512
watered down considerably due to private interests (Varkkey, 2016). Companies generally513
have a preference for expansion into forest areas, because of the timber that can be harvested514
and sold for start-up funds before the commencement of planting (Sayer et al., 2012). This515
increases demand for forested land among business elites. Companies that expand into516
15
community lands can expect the protection of their patrons in the face of community protest,517
and only a handful of land disputes between plantation companies and communities have518
concluded in favour of the communities.519
Overall in Indonesia, incentives for expansion have been stronger than those for520
intensification. What little technology-based intensification that does happen is not521
disseminated effectively, especially to smallholders, to have the intended land saving effects.522
Furthermore, the market-driven productivity and profits achieved by large-scale commercial523
plantations serves as an incentive to expand the land area, since such lands are so easily524
obtainable, especially through patronage transactions enabled by ambiguous land tenures and525
the varying capacities of provincial authorities (Mukherjee and Sovacool, 2014). This is526
further enabled by the fragmented land-use administration and legal pluralism in Indonesia,527
both discussed in detail in a recent article by Kunz et al. (2017). Furthermore, as the528
international community increasingly puts pressure on the Indonesian government to halt529
deforestation and address land-related social conflicts, there has been a trend of “land530
banking” among plantation companies, where they try to gain the rights to as much land as531
possible in anticipation of possible future blocks to access in the form of government532
moratoriums or pledges (Sayer et al., 2012). Such land banking indeed accelerates533
deforestation, as often these lands are logged for profitable timber first, even though there is534
no immediate intention to plant oil palm (Mukherjee and Sovacool, 2014).535
536
3. New Land Use Trends537
Indonesia and Malaysia have historically experienced opposite trends of land use for oil palm538
due to prevailing socio-political incentives and disincentives for either intensification or539
expansion. We find however that recent socio-political developments are triggering some540
shifting land use trends in both countries. For Malaysia, the state of Sarawak is currently the541
most forested state in the country, and also has a significant amount of native customary542
rights (NCR) land. It is the country’s final frontier for oil palm given the state’s reserve of543
untouched peatlands and NCR lands. This is leading to conflicts with both the international544
scientific community and local indigenous communities. In Indonesia, the Joko Widodo545
(Jokowi) administration has called for strengthened moratoriums and meeting production546
goals without deforestation. Pledges from commercial buyers to use only “no deforestation,547
no peat, no exploitation” (NDPE) palm oil is further limiting the market for palm oil on548
newly developed lands (Rijk et al., 2017). The discussions in section 3.1 and 3.2 will evaluate549
these recent developments and consider if they will have a long-term effect on the land use550
trends of both Indonesia and Malaysia, and the regional palm oil sector as a whole.551
552
3.1. Sarawak as the Final Frontier553
With most of the agriculturally suitable lands in Peninsula Malaysia and Sabah are already554
developed for palm oil and other crops, Sarawak is the only remaining state with any555
significant arable land left. In 2011 it was identified that 75% or 1 million hectares of556
Malaysia’s maximum expansion potential, keeping in mind the 50% forest cover pledge, was557
in Sarawak (Chin, 2011). Indeed, apart from going abroad, for example to Indonesia, many558
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Malaysian companies are also considering Sarawak as greenfield areas for palm oil (Chin,559
2011; ETP, 2014).560
Sarawak has been a latecomer in palm oil because of the challenging terrain there. With a561
huge land size of 12.4 million hectares, it is Malaysia’s biggest state, though only 28% is562
suitable for agriculture, with the remaining areas being steep land (58%), peatland (13%) and563
infertile land (1%) (Lian, 2016). From a relatively small 543,400 hectares of oil palm in564
2005, Sarawak’s planted area has expanded to more than 1.4 million hectares in 2015,565
accounting for 25.5% of all palm oil planted land in Malaysia. It contributed about566
$2.03billion (9%) of the state’s total exports in 2015, of which the State is able to collect567
substantial state tax (Borneo Post, 2016). The state has earmarked a total of 2 million568
hectares, or 15% of the state’s land for palm oil by 2020 (Borneo Post, 2011; Chin, 2011).569
Reaching this 2 million hectare target would bring Malaysia’s national forest cover down to570
about 51%, just at the brink of its pledge. At the national level, an additional 3.5% of forest571
cover loss does not seem like very much, but considering that almost all of this expansion572
will be concentrated in a single state, the consequences are worrying.573
Sarawak, a megadiverse area home to charismatic fauna like the orang-utan and the sun bear,574
currently has the world’s highest rate of tropical forest loss, according to data from Global575
Forest Watch. Most of the oil palm expansion in Sarawak has been on arable lands, which are576
either natural forests, NCR lands or peatlands. Expansion of oil palm in Sarawak started577
during the chief ministership of the long-serving Taib Mahmud. During this time, patronage578
land transactions were rampant, and it was easy for companies to flaunt laws and offer bribes579
for land (Lapidus, 2016). Mahmud’s successor, Adenan Satem, seemed to be a breath of fresh580
air for environmentalists when he stated that “no more palm oil is needed – cukup (enough)”581
(Chia and Ten, 2015) and declared that his government would not approve expansion of palm582
oil plantations (Lapidus, 2016).583
Satem’s reputation among environmentalists was jeopardised, however, by his announcement584
in 2016 that his government had decided to open up coastal lowland areas (peatlands) as the585
most strategic alternative resource to dwindling arable land, to encourage the development of586
the oil palm industry in Sarawak (Lian and Sibbon, 2016). It was revealed that about a quarter587
of Sarawak’s peatlands have already been converted for oil palm (Lian, 2016). More than 100588
local and international scientists responded with a strongly worded letter in the journal Global589
Change Biology declaring that peatland development in Sarawak for oil palm would have590
dire consequences for climate change as carbon is released during land clearing, and as haze591
pollution worsens due to fires related to peatland draining (Wijedasa et al., 2016). This592
echoed an earlier call by Malaysia’s leader of the opposition, Anwar Ibrahim, for Malaysian593
companies to stop planting oil palm on peat, due to carbon emissions and sequestration594
concerns. Ibrahim’s call was viewed by the palm oil industry as a further sign that the595
opposition leader had been “bought over” by Western interests who were not interested in596
seeing Malaysia prosper (Ooi, 2013).597
Following Satem’s sudden death just three years after taking office, the Sarawak government598
focused more on expansion into NCR lands. As of 2016, out of the 1.5 million hectares of599
NCR land, 328,000 hectares have been converted into oil palm plantations. Sarawak’s600
minister for Agriculture Modernization and Rural Economy said the focus on NCR land was601
to transform the large tracts of unproductive and under-utilised lands into viable economic602
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units (Goh, 2016) to help boost the rural economy (Borneo Post, 2016). The identification of603
these lands as idle and underutilised is problematic (Carlson et al., 2012), as often these lands604
are used for community farming or as areas for hunting and gathering.605
Problems related to expansion into NCR lands are twofold. Firstly, companies that have606
received concessions that include NCR lands are almost certain to be involved in conflicts607
with local communities. Indeed, a list by Danish forest consultants Pro Regenwald (2010)608
identified at least 57 land conflicts from 1995 to 2010 related to oil palm plantations on NCR609
lands. A particularly high-profile case was that of Tabung Haji, one of Malaysia’s biggest oil610
palm plantation companies, clashing with over 100 Iban families near Serian as they blocked611
the company from harvesting oil palm on 3,000 hectares of their NCR land (Papau, 2014). In612
the midst of negative publicity, Tabung Haji was compelled to abandon its plans.613
Secondly, we observed16 that villagers who willingly hand over NCR lands to implementing614
agencies are essentially “bribed” to do so because this is the only way that they are assured to615
receive titles deeds for their land (SALCRA, 2012). Obtaining the title deeds through other616
means is almost impossible. Furthermore, implementing agencies such as the SALCRA have617
poor track records of managing these lands productively. SALCRA runs about 51,000618
hectares of NCR land on behalf of indigenous groups in Sarawak. However, on average, the619
reported productivity of these areas is about a tenth of that achieved in commercial620
plantations (about $391 compared to $2,905 per hectare in 2009). While these figures may be621
underrepresented due to alleged siphoning off of profits by SALCRA’s chairman before622
formal reporting (Sarawak Report, 2011), it is clear that there is very little incentive for623
technology-based land saving intensification for agencies such as SALCRA.624
The rate of land use change in Sarawak due to oil palm is worrying because of the fact that625
Sarawak, due to its separate colonial legacy from Peninsula Malaysia, is exempt from most626
national policies and standards and can set their own regulations (Mukherjee and Sovacool,627
2014). Hence, while Sarawak’s target of 2 million hectares of palm oil by 2020 would still628
bring overall forest cover within the 50% pledge limit, there is no guarantee that Sarawak will629
keep to these national limits to growth. Sarawak leaders continually admonish the central630
government for not paying adequate attention to Sarawak, resulting in a large development631
gap between Sarawak and Peninsula Malaysia. The rapid expansion into palm oil is part of632
the state’s insistence that “Sarawak should not be left behind” (Ling, 2016). Sarawak also633
often reminds critics of the fact that its current forest cover, at 65%, has exceeded the national634
commitment of 50% (Lian and Sibbon, 2016). Hence, such arguments for development could635
possibly be used to justify further expansion into peatlands and supposedly idle and636
underutilised NCR lands in Sarawak. While expansion in accordance with the Jevons paradox637
in other parts of Malaysia has been regulated by the forest cover pledge, as well as access to638
land in Indonesia, it remains to be seen if the same national pledge is enough to regulate639
further expansion in Sarawak.640
641
3.2. Indonesia: Prospects for a U-Turn?642
16 During a University of Newcastle field trip to NCR areas near Kuching, Sarawak in March 2017.
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While local political and socio-economic realities in Sarawak may be creating expansionary643
incentives, the current situation in Indonesia may reveal a trend in the opposite direction.644
Even though both the Malaysian and Indonesian oil palm sectors have consistently been the645
target of anti-deforestation pressures at local and international levels (Mukherjee and646
Sovacool, 2014), such pressures have always been more pronounced in Indonesia (Jong,647
2016). This is because, unlike Malaysia, most of the land use change related to oil palm648
expansion in Indonesia affects large areas of primary rainforests and peatlands (Wicke et al.,649
2011). These pressures have translated into particular responses from both the Indonesian650
government and major buyer corporations involved in the sector.651
President Jokowi, who took office in 2014, has been particularly progressive in putting land652
saving policies in place. Just a few weeks into his new presidency the region was hit with a653
serious transboundary haze crisis (Nazeer, 2015). Transboundary haze is largely a result of654
fires in forests and peatlands in Indonesia’s outer islands, often related to land clearing655
activity for agriculture, and improved land management to overcome the haze crisis has been656
a priority area for the Jokowi administration since 2014 (Lim, 2015).657
In 2015 Jokowi extended a moratorium set by his predecessor, President Yudhoyono, that658
halts the issuance of new conversion permits for primary forests and peatlands for business659
purposes (Jakarta Post, 2015). Jokowi also announced plans to claw back concessions in fire-660
prone peatlands that have not been cultivated (Chan, 2016), an important response to the661
recent land banking trend in Indonesia. The beginning of 2016 saw the establishment of the662
Peatland Restoration Agency (Badan Restorasi Gambut, BRG), tasked with coordinating and663
accelerating the recovery of peatlands to increase their resilience against fires. Led by a team664
of conservationists, the BRG aims to rehabilitate more than 2 million hectares (Situmorang665
and Dunstan, 2016). To complement this, Jokowi also announced a moratorium on all666
activities that could damage the nation’s peatlands (Harvey, 2016). The President signed667
Government Regulation No. 57/2016, which declared that no new land opening on peatlands668
will occur until the zonation for conservation and cultivation is fixed.669
In April 2017 Jokowi announced plans to issue a decree on a new moratorium suspending all670
new oil palm plantation issuances for the next three years (Rachmat, 2017). This is the first671
land moratorium specifically targeting the oil palm industry. Contrary to past policies that672
focused on market creation to meet ever increasing palm oil production targets, a draft text of673
the new proposed moratorium highlights intensification as a strategy to reduce pressure on674
land. Through this moratorium, Jokowi aims to reduce further geographical expansion of the675
palm oil industry through increasing productivity on existing planted areas through replanting676
with improved seeds, encouraging certification, and also smallholder capacity building. The677
president stated that “current plantations are enough, as long as the seeds are proper, it is678
possible to double productivity” (CRR, 2017a). The draft moratorium also specifically679
instructs provincial governors, district heads and mayors to postpone the issuing of principle680
location permits and clearing permits for new oil palm plantations (CRR, 2017a).681
Large manufacturing corporations that buy oil palm in bulk from Indonesian growers have682
also been receiving pressure from their consumers to source their palm oil more sustainably.683
As a result, 365 global companies have adopted zero-deforestation or NDPE policies,684
including 25 of the largest palm oil traders and refiners in the world (CRR, 2017b). For685
example, Unilever has released its Sustainable Palm Oil Sourcing Policy which commits the686
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company to sourcing 100% NDPE palm oil by 2020. Unilever uses about 1 million tonnes of687
crude palm oil (CPO) and about 0.5 million tonnes of palm kernel oil (PKO) per annum in the688
manufacturing of its consumer goods. This makes Unilever among the largest users of palm689
oil in the world, buying up about 8% of global palm oil production (Unilever, 2017).690
These are new forms of market-driven change that are having land saving effects. If a grower691
continues to develop its land bank on peat, through deforestation or by exploiting local692
communities, it runs a risk of suspension by buyers with NDPE policies, and will be unable693
to sell CPO and PKO. Indeed, Indonesian growers such as IOI Corporation, Austindo694
Nusantara Jaya, Sawit Sumbermas Sarana, and Provident Agro have been suspended by their695
buyers due to NDPE non-compliance. Even if these growers find niche buyers that do not696
adopt NDPE policies, this would likely be at a cheaper price. In contrast, NDPE compliant697
growers enjoy wider, more secure markets, and can sell their CPO and PKO at higher prices698
(CRR, 2017b). Hence, the potential benefits from green products can be used to compensate699
the ‘benefits’ of using primary forests, peat, and exploitation (Purnomo et al., 2018). While a700
booming market can result in expansion in accordance with the Jevons paradox, a market that701
changes to display a preference for land saving should result in intensification to make up for702
the lost opportunities of expansion. Indeed, the research consortium Chain Reaction Research703
calculated that about 29% of Indonesia’s land bank which has already been leased out cannot704
be developed without violating buyers’ NDPE policies (CRR, 2017b).705
The combination of market pressure and the newly proposed government moratorium, if706
passed, will impact on the oil palm industry’s expansion potential. The moratorium will707
effectively halt any new increases in land leased out for oil palm, and this would limit708
expansion to only 3 million hectares in the future, based on existing permits (Rachmat, 2017).709
Within these 3 million hectares of potentially developable land, growers would be unlikely to710
develop the 29% that do not fulfil NDPE requirements if they cannot find a market for non-711
NDPE CPO and PKO. Undeveloped land would likely be subject to the claw back provision712
where licenses for unused productive forestland can be revoked. This means that only about713
71% of the 3 million available hectares17 can be developed. While this is still a huge area to714
be developed and significantly more than the estimated 0.5 million hectares set to be715
developed in Sarawak, it still indicates a significant shift away from policies that incentivise716
expansion in the past.717
It is possible that shifting consumer patterns and new moratoriums will trigger an about-turn718
in Indonesia’s strategy, from historically expansionist to land saving in favour of719
intensification. However, there are risks that come along with such increased regulations. As720
we know, the Malaysian palm oil industry is among the most regulated industries in the721
country, and yet most of the big plantation players in Malaysia are local companies, who are722
less likely to divest if regulation gets too tight. This is not the case with Indonesia. Over-723
regulation of the Indonesian oil palm industry, which is made up of about 50% foreign724
interests, may result in investors leaving the country for newer greenfield areas like Africa,725
Papua New Guinea or Latin America (CRR, 2017a), a point which the Indonesian726
Presidential Staff Office concurs.18 Hence, the most likely outcome may be that both727
expansion and intensification will occur simultaneously in Indonesia.728
17 Author’s own calculations extrapolated from available sources.
18 Interview with officials at the Indonesian Presidential Staff Office on 6 January 2016.
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The clock is ticking. Indonesia is going to face scarcity for land suitable for sustainable oil729
palm cultivation in the near future. According to a study by Pirker (2016) which maps the730
lands suitable for oil palm cultivation, there are 18.2 million hectares of land in Indonesia731
suitable for the plant. With 12.3 million hectares already in operation as oil palm plantation732
areas, there are around 5.9 million hectares left for further cultivation. As many scholars have733
argued, the business model that relies on expansion to satisfy increasing demands is no longer734
feasible (Murphy, 2007; Pirker et al., 2016). And yet, change will not be easy. The735
government is not the only actor affecting public policy and its results. On February 2017,736
the government issued new rules to oblige agribusinesses to hand over and protect carbon-737
rich concessions in protected peat areas. Rather than sitting quietly, the business sectors,738
aided by politicians, resisted the regulation and brought the regulation to the Supreme Court.739
On October 2017, the Supreme Court finally concluded that the regulation is invalid (Jong740
and Arumingtyas, 2017).741
742
While the President has proposed a new moratorium and is attempting to hold companies743
accountable for their actions, it remains unclear when and how seriously the measures will be744
implemented. Furthermore, the issue of intensification policies is located in a complex policy745
environment of land use trade-offs and competing interests. In Indonesia, forest and land746
management is not only related to the interactions between government policies and the747
industry, but also to other actors such as indigenous people and local populations. For748
instance in September 2017, in response to land conflicts between companies and forest749
dependent communities, President Jokowi issued Presidential Regulation No.88/2017 on750
Resolving Land Disputes Inside Forest Zones (Peraturan Presiden Nomor 88 Tahun 2017751
tentang Penyelesaian Penguasaan Tanah dalam Kawasan Hutan) to protect the rights of752
indigenous people and local communities. However, this policy could have unintended753
consequences related to forest conservation. Using this regulation, smallholders claiming754
local community status can legally add more lands for their oil palm land.755
756
4. Conclusion757
The key economic principles of Jevons’ classic paradox are reconstituted in contemporary758
energy, forestry and extractive sectors, where efficiencies lead to lower costs and potential759
savings, but demand and consumption continues to rise, thus driving growth and increases in760
total output. The human manifestation of the Jevons paradox, driven by complex social and761
political factors, means that R&D technical breakthroughs, such as high-yielding seed762
varieties and ideal levels of nutrients and fertilisers for plants, makes production more763
efficient and enables consumers to buy more palm oil. When palm oil is produced more764
efficiently, for example, the basic tendency is for people to buy larger volumes of edible palm765
oil, to fill larger items of cookware, and to prepare larger (often excessive) quantities of food.766
Middle class Indonesians, Malaysians and many others seem to be living in a culture of767
excess, and arguably have not yet hit the crucial (but difficult to quantify) turning point in the768
Kuznets curve, where rising incomes and shifting consumer preferences begin to reduce769
environmental impacts. There is, however, a potential market impact stemming from pledges770
by commercial buyers to use only “no deforestation, no peat, no exploitation” (NDPE) palm771
oil that needs to be monitored. And yet we are still facing the sustainability dilemma raised772
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than biodiversity conservation, keeping us locked in a model of economic growth that775
requires further land conversion and deforestation.776
This paper conducted a research mapping exercise to explore the interconnected but divergent777
trends of land use change in Indonesia and Malaysia. Generally for both countries during the778
early years of the palm oil boom, the increasing price and demand for CPO and PKO resulted779
in high levels of market-driven intensification as more farmers changed their product mix to780
the more profitable oil palm. Different socio-political developments in both countries have781
resulted in almost opposite trajectories of land use. Most significantly, expansion in Malaysia782
has been constrained by the Malaysian government’s voluntary pledge in the late 1990s to783
keep 50% forest cover, and this has steered Malaysia’s oil palm strategy towards technology-784
driven intensification alongside controlled expansion. Malaysia’s 50% pledge is non-binding785
and politically symbolic, and while there are tangible results that seem to be linked to the786
land conservation pledge, the degree of capital mobility and the opportunities to invest in787
neighbouring Indonesia have driven an expansionist corporate strategy that transcends the788
apparent land restrictions in Malaysia. Indonesia has made no such pledges and has followed789
expansionist policies focused on market creation and production goals, which has in turn790
resulted in limited incentives for technology-driven intensification. In short, continued791
prosperity in this deeply regionalised sector is based on intensification in Malaysia and792
expansion in Indonesia, driven not only by local interests but also significantly by Malaysian793
capital and investment. Hence, deforestation in Indonesia is linked to the regional palm oil794
complex, as Cramb and McCarthy (2016) call it, and all regional (and global) stakeholders795
will bear the brunt of the environmental stresses caused by increased palm oil production.796
As a final observation, this paper found that in recent years, new socio-political developments797
in both countries are changing the patterns of land use, production and forest management.798
Sarawak, as Malaysia’s final frontier with room for plantation expansion, has substantial state799
autonomy in land policies, and has the authority to exclude itself from the nationally-800
mandated forest cover pledge. On the other hand, the combined effects of President Jokowi’s801
proposed moratorium to suspend all new oil palm plantation issuances, and CPO and PKO802
buyers who are increasingly subjecting themselves to NDPE, policies may have a land saving803
effect on Indonesia’s land banks. There are signs of change in government policy and804
industry practice, and the pressure is mounting on Southeast Asian countries to find805
cooperative solutions to transboundary haze and deforestation that is linked to plantation806
agriculture, although in the words of Czech (2006), we continue to fiddle while Rome is807
burning.808
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